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Mechonomics:   design   thinking   for   growth   and   resilience   of   soci-­
otechnical  organizations  
  
Bernardino  CHIAIA,1  Valerio  DE  BIAGI1  






In  this  paper  the  principal  ideas  of  mechonomics  are  introduced.  Mechonomics  is  a  neologism  indicating  
the  possibility  of  predicting  the  behaviour  of  sociotechnical  organizations  in  the  complex  and  intercon-­
nected  world  of  the  21st  century  by  means  of  models  borrowed  from  structural  mechanics.  In  particular,  
the  concepts  of  growth,  resilience  and  robustness  of  the  organizations  are  discussed.  The  analogy  with  
structural  and  natural  systems  is  shown  to  be  sound  and  permits  to  interpret  the  effects  of  the  size  of  
the  organization  and  of   its   internal  arrangement  and  collapse  of  enterprises  and   institutions.  Conse-­
quence-­based  design,  as  the  tool  able  to  tackle  with  unpredictable  stimuli  and  external  effects,  is  intro-­
duced  as   the  only   robust  philosophy   that  should  pervade  design  and  management  of  sociotechnical  
organizations.  
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1.   Introduction  
In  recent  years,  many  authors  have  pointed  out  the  need  to  take  into  account  unexpected  events  during  
the  functioning  lifetime  of  a  sociotechnical  system  (like,  e.g.,  healthcare,  education,  transportation  etc.).  
They  borrowed  from  mechanics’   terms   like  resilience  and  fragility   to  define  the  system’s  different  re-­
sponses  to  those  actions.  The  different  proposed  approaches,  however,  still  fail  to  provide  models  for  
designing  and  managing  these  systems  in  a  quantitative  and  effective  way.  
In  the  literature,  many  attempts  to  transfer  physical  concepts  to  the  realm  of  economics  are  reported.  
However,  we  have  noticed  that  practical  and  applicable  tools  are  missing.  The  term  econophysics,  as  a  
subfield  of  statistical  mechanics,  includes  methods  developed  by  physicists  to  solve  problems  in  finance  
and  markets,  usually   including  stochastic  processes  and  nonlinear  dynamics  [1].  Georgescu-­Roegen  
[2]  applied  the  concepts  of  energy  and  entropy  in  economics,  stating  that  the  2nd  law  of  thermodynamics  
governs  the  economic  processes.  Despite  the  great  efforts  carried,  e.g.,  to  apply  chaos  and  fractal  the-­
ory  to  economics  and  finance,  the  results  are  still  restricted  to  a  qualitative  reasoning.    
The  objective  of  the  paper  is  to  introduce  new  theoretical  concepts  and  quantitative  models  and  strate-­
gies  to  predict  and  control  functioning,  growth  and  collapse  of  sociotechnical  systems  like  enterprises  
and  institutions,  starting  from  the  rules  of  mechanics  enriched  by  the  theory  of  complexity  and  by  the  
strategies  of  Nature.  We  believe  that  quantitative  theories  inspired  by  structural  mechanics,  adapted  to  
the   sociotechnical   realm,   can  describe   -­  with   high  degree  of   accuracy  and   in  most   circumstances   -­  
functioning,  growth  and  collapse  of  sociotechnical  systems.    
Artificial  and  natural  structures  obey  the  laws  of  mechanics  and  show  peculiar  features  at  collapse.  Mass  
and  energy,  resulting  in  forces  and  displacements,  are  the  governing  entities  both  at  the  micro-­  and  at  
the  macro-­level.  Mechanical  quantities  like  stiffness,  strength  and  ductility  define  the  structural  behav-­
iour  as  elastic  or  plastic,  robust  or  brittle.  This  is  not  a  mere  qualitative  analogy,  but  we  believe  that  the  
similitude  between  mechanical  systems  and  sociotechnical  organizations  can  be  made  quantitative  if  
the  concepts  of  “mass”  and  “energy”  are  properly  identified  -­  as  analogies  -­  in  sociotechnical  organiza-­
tions  like  enterprises,  institutions  and  groups  of  people.  A  pioneering  and  inspiring  source  of  such  anal-­
ogy  is  the  masterpiece  “Crowds  and  Power”  by  Canetti  [3],  where  the  interplay  between  the  masses  and  
the  power  at  the  sociological  level  is  investigated  by  means  of  metaphors.    
	  	  
Based  on  these  assumptions,  our  target  is  to  find  innovative  tools  to  control  organization  processes  and  
predict  their  outcomes  in  a  range  of  situations  where  established  methods  fail.  The  resulting  theory  may  
be  called  mechonomics,  indicating  tools  and  models  borrowed  from  (structural)  mechanics  and  applied  
to  economics  and  social  sciences.  Deterministic  and  probabilistic  models,  defining   the  robustness  of  
artificial  and  natural  structural  systems  under  loads  and  environmental  stimuli  will  be  adapted  to  soci-­
otechnical  organizations.  Not  only  financial  firms,  banks  and  companies  could  benefit  of  the  new  tools  
and  models,  but  also  public  institutions  like  large  communities,  health  care  and  social  security  organi-­
zations  could  take  advantage  from  the  research  results  to  control  their  processes  and  gain  resilience  
and  efficiency.  
Dealing,  e.g.,  with  sociotechnical  practices  and  organizations,  already  many  years  ago  interaction  de-­
sign  provided  interesting  observations  about  the  co-­existence  of  actions,  activities  and  services.  Later  
system  design  focused  on  the  largest  wholes  that  human  beings  create,  examining  in  particular  collec-­
tive  interactions  (see,  e.g.,  the  concept  of  fourth  order  design  by  Buchanan  [4]).  Therefore,  management  
theory  naturally  shifts  into  design  thinking,  as  the  four  functional  aspects  of  management  (i.e.,  planning,  
organizing,  directing  and  controlling)  naturally  belong  to  its  realm.  The  20th  and  the  21st  century  brought  
the   failure  of   traditional  management   theories  when  applied   to  complex  socio-­technical  systems   like  
welfare,  healthcare,  environmental  control,  education,  transportation  etc.  Some  design  thinkers  argue  
that  most  of  the  disasters   in  these  cases  were  caused  by  a  lack  of  good  human-­factors  and  human-­
centred  design  [5].    
We  believe  that  complex  sociotechnical  systems  are  often  poorly  designed  with  regard  not  only  to  the  
lack  of  human-­centered  design  but  also  to  a  lack  of  a  wider  nature-­centred  design.  The  result   is  that  
people  in  charge  of  these  organizations  are  blamed  for  their  errors  although  the  problem  is  intimately  
rooted  in  the  organization  itself.    
In  this  paper  we  will  discuss  crucial  aspects  of  human-­made  organizations  and  show  how  simple  lessons  
from  the  world  of  engineering  (where  basic  physical  and  mechanical  rules  define  all  the  performances),  
enriched  with  nature-­inspired  strategies  and  complexity,  can  provide  resilience  and  robustness  to  soci-­
otechnical  systems.    
The  theories  of  behavioural  economics,  i.e.,  the  study  of  the  effects  of  social,  psychological  and  emo-­
tional  factors  on  the  economic  decisions  of  individuals  and  institutions  [6],  may  seem  in  disagreement  
with  our  conjecture,  as  one  may  claim  that  the  “human  factor”   is  not  present   in  mechanical  systems.  
However,  as  evidenced  by  the  game  theory  applied  to  economics,  this  is  not  true  as  what  really  counts  
at  large  scales  is  the  collective  behaviour  of  the  population.  We  believe  that  sociotechnical  organizations  
follow  laws  similar  to  those  of  complex  structural  systems  made  of  a  large  numbers  of  elements.  Mecho-­
nomics  represents  a  new  tool  for  a  resilient  and  robust  approach  to  system  and  service  design,  including  
human  organizations,  societies  and  cultures.  Therefore,  it  can  be  considered  as  a  tool  in  the  context  of  
design  thinking,  taking  its  origin  from  physics  and  mechanics  and  evolving  into  economics  and  social  
sciences  [7][8].  
  
2.   The  glossary  of  mechonomics  
The  words  used  in  mechonomics  take  inspiration  from  the  mechanics  of  materials  and  structures.  That  
is,  a  small  glossary  is  required  before  entering  into  the  details.  An  every-­day  experiment  can  be  used  to  
describe  elasticity  and  plasticity  (Figure  1-­A).  Take  an  object  (like  a  rubber  band)   in  your  hands  and  
observe  it:  it  has  a  shape  (in  the  case  of  the  rubber  band,  memorize  its  length).  Now,  it  is  time  to  apply  
forces  to  the  object:  pull,  squash  and  twist  it.  When  such  “actions”  finish,  if  the  object  is  not  broken,  you  
can  note  either  that  the  shape  (or  the  length)  is  the  same  as  at  the  beginning  of  the  experiment,  or  that  
the  shape   is  different,   i.e.,  maintains  permanent  deformation.   In   the   first   case  we   refer   to  an  elastic  
material,  in  the  second  case,  respectively,  to  a  plastic  material.  In  a  more  precise  definition,  the  elastic  
material  is  the  one  that  returns  to  the  original  configuration  when  the  external  actions  are  removed.  In  
addition,  you  may  notice  that  there  are  objects  that  are  more  difficult  to  squash.  As  an  example,  a  bicycle  
tire  can  be  stretched  more  easily  than  a  car  tire.  Although  the  two  objects  are  made  of  rubber,  car  tire  
is  thicker  than  bicycle  one:  this  makes  the  first  stiffer  than  the  second.  The  stiffness  is  the  capacity  of  
the  object  to  oppose  to  the  forces  acting  on  it:  the  deformation  of  a  stiff  (or  rigid)  beam  is  smaller  than  
the  deformation  of  a  flexible  one.  Last,  but  not  least,  the  ideas  of  ductility  and  fragility  emerge.  A  ductile  
material  is  the  one  that  requires  to  be  largely  stretched  when  it  is  broken;;  on  the  contrary,  a  material  is  
said  to  be  fragile  if  it  breaks  suddenly,  i.e.,  without  appreciable  stretching.  The  concept  of  ductility,  valid  
at  the  material  level,  can  be  extended  to  the  structural  level  and  in  this  case  the  capacity  of  a  structure  
to  avoid  brittle  collapse  under  damage  and  external  stresses  is  named  resilience.  
With  the  overall  target  of  providing  resilience  to  sociotechnical  organizations,  consequence-­based  de-­
sign  tools  need  to  be  developed  for  risk  analysis  and  management  of  enterprises  and  institutions.  Spe-­
cific  approaches  must  be  individuated,  depending  on  the  size  of  the  system  and  on  its  peculiar  organi-­
zation.  Consequence-­based  approaches  are  not  currently  considered  by  management  theories  and  by  
most  of   the  economic  activities.  We  strongly  believe   that   they  should  be   included   in   the  design  and  
management  of  sociotechnical  organization,  exactly  like  engineers  do  for  the  design  of  aircrafts,  ships  
	  	  
and  bridges.  The  resilience  of  the  system  can  be  dramatically  enhanced  in  this  way  and,  whatever  the  
size  of  the  system,  a  more  robust  behaviour  can  be  achieved.  
Finally,  we  need  to  optimize  the  consequence-­based  approaches  by  means  of  the  strategies  of  Nature.  
Natural  structures,  in  fact,  thanks  to  the  evolution  process,  have  optimized  their  behaviour  with  respect  
to  external  stimuli  and  have  implemented  complexity  at  its  highest  degree  of  efficiency.  We  will  consider  
for  instance  the  limits  to  growth  of  natural  systems,  the  redundancy  and  compartmentalization  strategies  
of  plants  and  skeletons  and  the  ductile/self-­healing  characteristics  of  natural   tissues,  which  permit   to  
tackle  unexpected  dangerous  situations  without  evolving  into  global  collapse.  Inspiration  from  Nature  
will  lead  to  innovative  efficient  strategies  for  managing  more  robust  organizations  in  the  social  and  eco-­
nomic  environment.  
  
(A)                 (B)  
  
Fig.  1:  In  (A),  a  simple  experiment  illustrates  the  difference  between  fragile  and  ductile  material.  The  test  consists  
in  adding  weights  in  the  lower  basket  up  to  the  rupture  of  the  material.  If  the  material  is  fragile,  at  rupture  the  
stretching  is  small.  If  the  material  is  ductile,  at  rupture  the  stretching  is  large.  Notice  that  rupture  occurs  when  the  
same  quantity  of  weights  is  added  in  the  underneath  basket,  i.e.,  systems  may  show  different  response  under  the  
same  external  conditions.  Subfigure  (B):  in  (a)  an  example  of  progressive  collapse,  i.e.,  cascade  failure,  is  
sketched:  when  the  leftmost  domino  tile  is  moved,  it  collides  against  the  second  one  and  so  forth.  Two  strategies  
for  preventing  cascade  failure  are  pictured.  In  (b)  the  introduction  of  a  strong  element  (the  glued  tile)  stops  the  
propagation  of  the  movement.  In  (c)  the  compartmentalization  of  the  system  is  shown:  the  collapse  on  the  left  of  
the  system  cannot  propagate  to  the  right  side.  
  
3.   Progressive  collapse  of  the  economic  system:  fiction  or  reality?  
“According  to  the  late  reconstruction  of  the  facts,  all  started  in  a  May  afternoon  at  Marvin  and  Phoebe  
Sellers’  house,  Camino  de  Palmas  4011,  Tucson,  AZ.  It  was  Friday  and  Marvin  Sellers  was  checking  
the  balance  of  its  accounts.  The  decision  that  would  have  changed  history  took  about  one  hour”.  This  is  
the  incipit  of  the  novel  "Depression  or  Bust"  by  M.  Reynolds  [9].  After  a  discussion  with  his  wife,  Marvin  
decided  against  buying  the  new  refrigerator  he  had  ordered,  because  he  worried  about  his  money.  When  
Jim  Wilkins,  the  owner  of  the  appliance  store,  heard  about  the  order  cancellation,  his  immediate  reaction  
was  to  call  the  agent  in  Phoenix  and  cancel  the  request  of  3  new  refrigerators  “…because  of  large  unsold  
merchandise”.   Then,   just   after   this   phone   call,   Jim   “…  who  had   fallen   in   a   blue  mood…”   called  Bill  
Waters,  the  car  vendor  in  his  town,  and  cancelled  the  order  of  a  new  car.  After  this  call  Mr.  Waters,  “…  
feeling   that  a  general   tendency  was  growing…”,  asked  his  secretary   to  call   the  Buick  sales  office   in  
Denver  to  cut  the  monthly  car  supply  by  two  cars  per  month.  And  just  after  that,  he  called  his  real  estate  
agent  announcing   the  decision   to  postpone   the  purchase  of  a  new  house.  A   few  days  after,  Marvin  
Sellers,  who  was  a  carpenter,  was  fired  by  his  company,  which  had  lost  the  construction  job  of  the  new  
Bill  Waters’  house!  
The  most  important  lessons  of  the  satire  are  the  following.  The  first  is  the  amazing  connectedness  of  
the  economic  system.  Due  to  globalization  and  technological  innovation,  all  business  sectors  are  con-­
nected  via  direct  or  indirect  links,  and  finance  pervades  the  system  throughout  with  ubiquity  and  speed.  
Propagation  of  any  stimuli   is   random  and  uncontrolled  as   they  spread  through  the  system  incredibly  
fast.  Remarkably,   this   is  not   fiction  but  everyday  reality,  and  represents  one  of   the  drawbacks  of   the  
modern  liquid  society  [10],  not  adequately  taken  into  account  by  current  socio-­economic  models.  
In  fact,  the  second  lesson,  which  is  a  consequence  of  the  first,  is  the  domino-­like  cascade  failure  (Figure  
1-­B),  that  is,  the  progressive  amplification  of  a  small-­scale  event  to  larger  and  larger  scales,  up  to  the  
global  one.    
The  exponential   increase  of   links  between  firms,  enterprises,   institutions  and  individuals  provides  re-­
dundancy  to  the  system  but  also  favours  rapid  propagation  of  perturbation  effects  to  the  global  scale.  































to  purchase  a  refrigerator  produces  negative  consumer  reactions  leading  to  production  stagnation  and  
global  recession  at  larger  and  larger  scales.  Edward  Lorenz,  the  father  of  the  modern  theory  of  chaos,  
wondered  “…  will  the  flap  of  a  butterfly’s  wing  in  Brazil  set  off  a  tornado  in  Texas?”.  
  
4.   Weakness  of  large  organizations:  too  big  to  fail  or  to  survive?  
When  the  World  population  will  become  larger  than  20  billions  people,  there  will  be  at  least  2  or  3  billions  
of  new  western  style  consumers.  Due  to  growing  market  opportunities  and  to  increasing  competition  in  
many  business  sectors,  the  tendency  to  increase  the  size  of  enterprises  and  banks  will  continue.  The  
operations  of  merging  and  acquisition  testify  the  need  to  attain  a  certain  critical  mass   for  many  busi-­
nesses  (e.g.,  automotive,  air  transportation  and  energy  distribution  sectors).    
In  mechanics  it  is  well  known  that  the  main  cause  of  large  systems  fragility  is  represented  by  the  so-­
called  size-­scale  effect.  Galileo  early  in  1638  noticed  that  elephant’s  bones  are  intrinsically  more  brittle  
than  cat’s  bones,  although  the  constituent  bone  material  is  the  same  for  all  vertebrates  (that  is,  calcium  
carbonate).  At  the  beginning  of  19th  century  the  maximum  possible  height  of  a  tree  was  calculated  based  
on  the  mechanical  characteristics  of  the  wood  and  on  the  buckling  limit  of  rods.  All  living  beings  auto-­
matically  regulate  their  growth  up  to  a  specified  limit  corresponding  to  the  virtuous  balance  between  the  
energy  necessary  for  growth  and  functioning,  and  the  energy  that  can  be  assimilated  from  nourishment  
[11].  Engineers  know  that  structures,  as  their  size  increases,  dangerously  tend  to  brittleness.  The  theo-­
ries  of   fracture  mechanics  explain   this   tendency  alternatively  deterministically   (e.g.,  according   to   the  
growing  strain  energy  which  drives  crack  propagation)  or  statistically  (e.g.,  according  to  the  probability  
of  critical  defects  of  the  microstructure)  [12].  However,  in  any  system,  as  system  size  increases,  propa-­
gation  of  local  shocks  of  any  kind  occurs  more  and  more  rapidly  and  tends  to  extend  to  the  global  scale  
(total  collapse)  instead  of  remaining  confined  locally.  
A  topological  consequence  of  growth  is  the  progressive  unbalance  of  the  ratio  between  the  “volume”  of  
the  system  and  the  “area”  of  its  boundaries.  This  ratio  increases  with  system  scale,  and  this  can  explain,  
for  instance,  why  small  kids  dehydrate  faster  than  adults  and  why  small  animals  in  cold  climates  need  
thicker  furs  than  larger  ones.  In  economics,  the  above  reasoning  explains  why,  in  relatively  small  organ-­
izations,   the  external   exchange  dynamics  are  more  efficient   than   in   the   case  of   large  organizations  
permitting  a  faster  permeability  and  tendency  to  adapt  to  external  stresses  and  stimuli.  
The  progressive  weakening  of  companies  and  banks,  which  in  the  last  decades  largely  grew  through  
merging  and  acquisition   strategies,   is   crystal   clear.  Good  management  and   financial   practices  were  
often  abandoned  in  the  name  of  irrational  or  at  least  uncontrolled  growth.  Therefore,  we  are  not  surprised  
at  the  fragility  of  big  enterprises,  even  under  relatively  small  stimuli.  As  an  example  we  quote  the  cas-­
cade  effects   following  Lehman’s  Brothers  collapse   in  2008  and   the  subprime  bubble  highlighted   the  
fragility  of  the  world-­interconnected  financial  system.  Interestingly,  analyses  carried  through  the  years  
2008-­2015  showed  that  small  institutions  reacted  better  and  faster  to  the  effects  of  the  crisis  [13].  
On  the  other  hand,  some  institutions  (especially  banks)  have  been  considered  of  critical  importance  to  
become  recipients  of  beneficial  financial  policies  from  governments  or  central  banks  (the  Troubled  Asset  
Relief  Program  (TARP)  was  established  in  the  U.S.A.  for  this  purposes).  Proponents  of  this  theory  be-­
lieve  that  some  institutions  are  so  important  that  they  should  become  recipients  of  beneficial  financial  
and  economic  policies  from  governments  or  central  banks.  Some  economists  believe  that  economies  of  
scale  in  banks  and  in  other  businesses  are  worth  preserving  so  long  as  they  are  well  regulated  in  pro-­
portion  to  their  economic  influence,  and  therefore  that  the  “too  big  to  fail”  status  can  be  acceptable.  On  
the  contrary,  other  economists  say  the  giant  banks  must  be  broken  up.  Still  on  April  2014,  the  Interna-­
tional  Money  Fund  warned  that  the  problem  of  banks  seen  as  “too  big  to  fail”  is  still  unsolved.    
The  limits  to  growth  in  the  economic  context  have  been  investigated  by  the  Rome  Club  since  1972.  In  
the  Meadows  Report  [14],  they  examined  the  five  basic  factors  that  determine,  and  therefore  ultimately  
limit,  growth  on  Earth  -­  population,  agricultural  production,  natural  resources,  industrial  production,  and  
pollution.   Intrinsic   limits   to   exponential   growth  were   clearly   stated,   and   the   transition   from   irrational  
growth   to  global   (dynamic)  equilibrium  was  wished   for.   In   the  general   frame  of   economic   crisis  and  
resource   shortage,   inspired   by   early   ideas   of   counter-­productivity   and   diseconomy,   theories   of   de-­
growth  claiming  the  downscaling  of  production  and  consumption  are  becoming  more  and  more  popular.  
We  have  noticed  that  a  general  theory  concerning  the  optimal  growth  and  robustness  of  large  organi-­
zations  is  missing  in  the  current  state-­of-­the-­art.  Regarding  the  classical  theories  of  economic  growth,  
both  endogenous  and  exogenous  models  (e.g.,  AK  model  vs.  Harrod-­Domar  model)  do  not  give  evi-­
dence  of  the  tendency  to  brittleness  of  large  organizations.  Most  of  the  recent  studies  have  been  ori-­
ented   to   specific   business   sectors,   thus  missing   the   intimate   features  of   the  problem.  For   example,  
Pamolli  and  colleagues  [15]  carried  analyses  of  processes  of  growth  at  different  levels  of  aggregation  
in  the  context  of  disordered  systems  and  random  processes.  Attention  was  focused  to  the  economics  
and  policy  of  pharmaceuticals  and  health  systems  in  Europe,  and  to  the  growth  of  business  firms,  lead-­





5.   Fragility  of  populations  
In  order  to  make  other  analogies  between  disciplines  let  us  consider  the  way  we  are  connected  to  the  
internet:   glass   fibers   connect   our  Wi-­Fi   routers   to   the   servers.  Such   thin   cable-­like  objects   are   very  
flexible  and  very  strong.  Now,  let  us  consider  a  cup  for  drinking,  made  of  glass,  i.e.,  the  same  material  
of  the  fibers:  if  it  falls  on  the  ground  it  breaks.  How  it  is  possible?  It  happens  because  as  much  as  their  
size  increases,  materials  that  seem  ductile  and  deformable  at  micro-­scale  become  more  rigid  and  brittle.  
Despite  the  simplicity  of  the  previous  example,  the  fragility  in  large  systems  is  not  new  in  science  and  
sociology.  Thinking  about  ancient  civilizations  (like,  e.g.,  the  Egyptians,  the  Roman  Empire,  the  Maya,  
the  Aztecs  and,  recently,  the  Soviet  Union),  societal  collapse  was  certainly  triggered  by  environmental  
or  climate  changes,  hostile  neighbors  or  trade  partners  and  by  progressive  resource  consumption.  How-­
ever,  all  the  above  causes  are  not  sufficient  to  explain  the  (relatively  fast)  collapse,  as  noticed  by  Dia-­
mond  [16],  since  the  response  that  different  societies  had  to  such  threats  was  the  crucial  point.    
Diamond  also   suggests   that,   today,   people   collectively   face  many  of   the   same   issues  with   possibly  
catastrophic  near-­future  consequences  to  many  of  the  World's  populations.  In  the  context  of  developing  
countries,  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  affirmed  that  “state  building”  is  
the  central  objective  for  international  partnerships  in  situations  of  fragility.  The  long-­term  vision  is  “…  to  
help  national  reformers  to  build  effective,  legitimate,  and  resilient  state  institutions,  capable  of  engaging  
productively  with  their  people  to  promote  sustained  development”.  We  are  convinced  that  political  fra-­
gility  has  multiple  underlying  causes  and  it  can  produce  multiple  consequences  like  vulnerability  to  in-­
ternal  conflict,  inability  to  cope  with  humanitarian  disaster  and  high  risk  of  state  collapse.  
Thus,  the  response  of  human  organizations  against  extreme  external  stimuli  may  be  very  different.  As  
an  example,  consider   the  unexpected  capacity  of   the  Vietcong  people   to  survive  the  American  army  
(and  the  harmful  effects  of  the  forest).  The  heavy  bombing  made  by  B-­52  between  1968  and  1970  did  
not  kill  any  military  chief  among  the  Vietcong,  and  the  ground  operations  were  always  favorable  to  the  
locals.  On  the  contrary,  the  Spanish  conquest  of  the  Aztec  empire  easily  occurred  although  many  sol-­
diers  of   the  Cortés  expedition  of  1519  had  never  seen  combat  before  and  Cortés  himself  had  never  
commanded  men   in  battle  before.  Cortés  smartly  obtained  support   from  a  number  of   tributaries  and  
rivals  of  the  Aztecs,  like  the  Totonacs  and  other  city-­states  and  even  penetrated  as  a  friend  in  the  Mon-­
tezuma’s  entourage.  
Current  state-­of-­the-­art  provides  only  partial  explanation  for  these  historical  events.  On  the  contrary,  we  
believe  that  the  mechonomics  analogy  can  give  new  insights  on  them.  Borrowing  terms  from  structural  
mechanics,  the  behavior  of  the  Vietcong  can  be  defined  “resilient”,  whereas  the  response  of  the  Aztec  
to  the  external  attack  was  “fragile”  (further  details  on  such  terms  are  given  in  the  following).  A  funda-­
mental  aspect  is  represented  by  the  activation  of  internal  weakening  mechanisms,  within  the  Aztec  pop-­
ulation,  strengthening  the  invaders,  which  were  not  activated  in  the  case  of  Vietnam.  These  mechanisms  
are  analogous   to   those   inducing  cracking  cascade  effects   inside  a  stressed  solid,  at   the  micro-­  and  
nano-­level.  The  micro-­defects  and  cracks,  driven  by  the  external  supply  of  energy,  begin  to  coalesce  
and,  at  the  end,  lead  to  the  fracture  of  the  structure.  The  resilient  behavior  of  the  Vietcong  population  
was  mostly  due  to  their  strategies  of  compartmentalization,  which  prevented  cascade  failure  (see  Figure  
1-­B).    
In  April  1968,  a  group  of  thirty  individuals  gathered  in  the  Accademia  dei  Lincei  in  Rome;;  they  founded  
the  “Club  of  Rome”,  an  informal  organization  initially  aimed  at  examining  the  complex  of  problems  that  
occurs   to   some  degrees   in  all   societies  and   that   contain   interacting   technical,   social,   economic  and  
political  elements.  The  first  study  on  the  predicament  of  mankind  [14]  showed  that,  even  if  technology  
pushes  to  new  discoveries  and  efficient  uses  of  energy,  unlimited  resources  do  not  appear  to  be  the  key  
for  growth  in  the  world  system.  In  a  recent  updated  study  [17],  the  prices  of  the  resources  in  a  deeply  
interconnected  system  are  the  switches  for  the  survival  or  the  collapse.  As  the  prices  rises,  geologists  
would  find  further  resources,  biologists  begin  to  squeeze  more  and  more  from  the  crops,  and  so  forth.  
Apparently,  the  only  sustainable  scenario  is  the  one  in  which  powerful  technologies  for  pollution  abate-­
ment,  land  yield  enhancement,  land  protection,  and  conservation  of  nonrenewable  resources  are  imple-­
mented.  This  would  ensure  stability  in  the  population  and  better  life  expectancy.  
  
6.   Network  topology:  implications  for  system  behavior  and  failure  
Many  businesses  and  organizations  are  structured  as  networks.  A  possible  cause  of  default  of   large  
organizations  can  be  found   in  the  wrong  design  of   the  network  operations  that  are  put   into  place  for  
logistics  (see,  e.g.,  component  production,  goods  distribution,  marketing  and  sales  network).  For  more  
than  40  years,  science  treated  all  complex  networks  as  being  completely  random.  Recently,  attention  
has  been  drawn  to  the  topology  of  the  network  and  its  behavior  with  respect  to  all  failure  events  has  
been  investigated  accordingly.  
All  networks  are  made  of  interconnected  nodes  and  the  nature  and  distribution  of  the  links  defines  the  
network  topology.  The  two  more  important  classes  of  complex  networks  are  the  random  “homogeneous”  
networks  and  the  “scale-­free”  ones,  see  Figure  2-­A.  The  homogeneous  networks  consist  of  nodes  with  
	  	  
randomly  placed  connections  where  most  nodes  have  approximately  the  same  number  of  links.  There  
is  a  democratic  distribution  of  connection  and  all  nodes  have  the  same  importance.  Examples  of  such  
networks  are  the  highway  networks  in  US  and  the  network  of  hospitals  in  densely  populated  nations  like  
Italy  and  Japan  (i.e.,  hospitals  uniformly  distributed  across  the  territory).  
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Fig.  2:  Subfigure  A:  the  structure  of  a  random  and  a  scale-­free  networks  are  compared.  In  random  networks  (left-­
hand  side  sketch)  there  is  a  characteristic  vertex  degree  (in  this  case  equal  to  2)  that  is  more  frequent.  In  scale-­free  
networks  (right-­hand  side  sketch)  there  is  not  a  characteristic  vertex  degree:  the  nodes  with  few  connections  are  
more  than  those  with  many  connections  (called  hubs  of  the  network).  In  (B),  three  possible  scenarios  if  a  bomb  
explodes  close  to  a  building.  If  the  building  is  robust  and  resilient,  the  explosion  causes  a  damage  which  is  strictly  
confined  to  the  area  invested  by  the  injurious  phenomenon.  If   the  building  is  robust  but  not  resilient,   it  does  not  
collapse,  but  the  damage  caused  by  the  explosion  entails  cracking  and  further  damage  spreads  in  the  building.  If  
the  building  is  neither  robust  and  resilient,  the  explosion  causes  the  global  collapse,  i.e.,  the  total  destruction.  
  
On  the  opposite,  scale-­free  networks  present  a  hierarchical  structure  containing  hubs,  i.e.,  nodes  with  
a  very  high  number  of   links.  In  such  networks  the  distribution  of   linkages  follows  a  power   law  in  that  
most  nodes  have  just  a  few  connections  and  only  a  few  have  a  tremendous  number  of  links.  The  system  
has  no  characteristic  scale.  Examples  of  such  networks  include  the  European  airline  system  (with  hubs  
like  the  Frankfurt,  Paris  and  London  airports),  the  World  Wide  Web  or  the  energy  distribution  system  of  
France  (with  19  big  nuclear  plants  producing  77%  of  electricity  in  the  country).  
The  accidental  failure  of  a  number  of  nodes  in  a  homogeneous  network  can  break  the  system  into  non-­
communicating  islands.  These  network,  thus,  suffer  for  randomly  distributed  failures.  In  contrast,  scale-­
free  networks  are  more  robust  in  face  of  such  random  failures.  But  they  are  highly  vulnerable  to  a  coor-­
dinated  single  attack  against  their  hubs  [18].  Therefore,  adopting  a  scale-­free  network  topology  can  be  
convenient  and  robust  as  long  as  the  safety  and  security  of  the  hubs  are  guaranteed.  Consider,  e.g.,  
the  world-­wide  consequences  of  a  hacker  attack  to  Paris  Roissy  airport,  as  compared  to  the  negligible  
effects  (outside  France)  of  closing  for  some  days  Bordeaux  airport.  
In   the  case  of  enterprises  and   institutions,   the  network   topologies  show  different  characteristics  also  
depending  on  their  growth  history.  Of  course,  older  nodes  have  greater  opportunities  to  acquire  links.  
Interestingly,  we  have  noticed  that  public  institutions  tend  to  possess  homogenous  network  organiza-­
tion,  whereas  private  companies  and  businesses  normally  select  scale-­free  arrangements.  Another  ten-­
dency  is  the  polarization  of  the  job  market  into  two  systems,  one  scale-­free  network  comprising  a  few  
hubs  (high  qualified  and  well-­paid  jobs)  and  one  homogeneous  network  made  by  many  low-­level  occu-­
pations.  Polarization,  as  argued  in  recent  times,  is  leading  to  the  disappearance  of  the  middle-­class.  
According  to  the  state-­of-­the-­art,  many  sociotechnical  organizations  have  not  been  designed  with  ade-­
quate  “protections”  for  their  topology,  and  a  number  of  inefficiencies  and  failures  can  be  explained  by  
this  negligence.  
  
7.   Black  swans  and  unpredictable  events:  the  need  of  robustness  
History  tells  us  that  unexpected  events  may  occur  creating  surprise.  After  Willem  Janszoon’s  discover  
in  1606,  a  similar  belief  had  been  certainly  experienced  by  the  first  ornithologists  across  Australia  when  
observing  the  Cygnus  Atratus,  alias  a  black  swan.  In  the  Old  Europe,  people  were  convinced  that  all  
swans  were  white;;  an  unassailable  belief  as  it  seemed  completely  confirmed  by  empirical  evidence.    
This  proves  that  a  learning  process  based  on  pure  observations  has  limitations,  as  already  pointed  out  
by  the  famous  inductivist  turkey  [19].  Just  one  observation  can  invalidate  a  general  statement  derived  
from  millennia  of  confirmatory  sightings  of  millions  of  white  swans.  This  example  can  be  framed  in  the  
category  of  “black  swan”  events  [20].  Such  situations  may  also  be  considered  a  subset  of  a  wider  epis-­
temological  problem,  that  is,  the  problem  of  the  “unknown  unknowns”.  Black  swans  are  the  unexpected  















events,  which  have  not  been  considered  at  the  time  of  the  original  design  of  a  certain  system  until  they  
appear  for  the  first  time.  The  concept  of  black  swan  is  accompanied  by  the  problem  of  weak  signals,  
which  we  often  fail  to  foresee  when  carrying  risk  analyses  or  stress  tests  upon  companies  and  human  
systems.    
Black  swans  and  weak  signals,  from  a  statistical  point  of  view,  are  related  to  the  broader  tail  problem  of  
probabilistic  distributions.  Silver  [21]  states  that  there  are  systems  that  are  inherently  chaotic  and  are  
characterized  by  unpredictability.  
In  engineering,  the  term  robustness  relates  to  the  capacity  of  a  structure  not  to  suffer  disproportionate  
damage  under  unexpected  events.  In  other  words,  damage  occurring  at  a  local  scale  must  not  trigger  
the  (global)  collapse  (see  Figure  2-­B).  Engineers  have  found  various  strategies  to  provide  robustness  
to  a  structure,  mainly  by  playing  on  the  ways  the  loads  are  transferred  through  the  various  part  of  the  
structure   (e.g.,   redundancy)   or   inserting   structural   fuses   (e.g.,   crack   arresters)   in   order   to   compart-­
mentalize  the  system  [22].  A  robust  system  is  able  to  develop  plastic  mechanisms  without  compromising  
the  overall  structure,  which  does  not  collapse.  
Resilience  relates  to  the  capacity  of  the  system  to  accommodate  the  (unexpected)  external  loads  and  
to  deform  elastically.  Because  of  the  basic  meaning  of  the  concepts,  the  term  “resilience”  is  well  diffused  
in  other  disciplines.  In  sociology  and  psychology,  resilience  is  defined  as  an  individual’s  ability  to  properly  
adapt  to  stress  and  adversity.  In  engineering  terms,  in  order  to  have  robust  systems,  resilience  goes  
hand-­to-­hand  with  stiffness.  The  stiffness  of  a  system  is  its  capacity  to  deform  once  subjected  to  external  
loads.  The  larger  the  stiffness  is,  the  smaller  the  displacements  are.  
We  believe  that  the  above  concepts  of  robustness  against  unexpected  events  can  be  applied  also  to  
banks,  enterprises  and  public  institutions,  especially  now  when  they  are  nodes  of  a  global  network.  For  
instance,  Europe  is  starting  to  be  worried  about  resilience  and  robustness  of  engineering,  economic  and  
social  systems.  In  fact,  the  Central  Bank  is  performing  the  so-­called  “stress-­tests”  on  the  principal  banks,  
and   the  Horizon2020   funding  program   includes  a  number  of   research   calls   concerning   resilience  of  
critical  infrastructures  under  accidental  events.  The  response  of  sociotechnical  systems  to  unpredictable  
stimuli  can  be  very  different  and  may  lead  to  failure  or  to  positive  counter-­reactions  depending  on  their  
internal  organization,  on  their  capacity  to  absorb  and  distribute  the  external  stresses  and  on  the  ability  
to  direct  the  energy  toward  appropriate  channels.    
The  capacity  of  a  system  to  tolerate  damage  and  changes  is,  in  fact,  a  key  property  for  the  survival  and  
the  success.  The  response  of  a  system  to  an  external  unexpected  event  can  be  described  through  two  
different  concepts:  robustness  and  resilience.  The  former  refers  to  the  capacity  of  an  entity  not  to  be  
disproportionately  damaged  when  an  error  occurs.  In  civil  engineering,  as  already  mentioned,  the  ro-­
bustness  is  the  ability  of  a  structure  to  withstand  events  like  fire,  explosions,  impact  or  the  consequences  
of  human  error,  without  being  damaged  to  an  extent  disproportionate  to  the  original  cause.  To  make  a  
comparison  with  computer  sciences,  a  robust  software  cannot  crash  when  a  wrong  input  is  given.    
On  the  contrary,  resilience  refers  to  the  capacity  of  the  system  to  cope  with  change.  A  clear  definition  of  
resilience  in  organizations  is  given  by  BS65000  as  the  ability  of  an  organization  to  anticipate,  prepare  
for,  and  respond  and  adapt  to  incremental  change  and  sudden  disruptions  in  order  to  survive  and  pros-­
per.  Hollnager,  discussing  about  systems,  states  that  complex  entities  are  dynamic  and,  in  the  majority  
of  their  life  (e.g.,  the  operations  in  a  society),  they  are  in  a  stable  state.  But,  because  of  the  continuous  
external  stimuli,   the  dynamic  stability  can   turn   into  a  dynamic   instability.   In  such  situation,  a   resilient  
system  must  be  able  to  respond  to  changes  and  challenges  without  losing  its  control.  An  example  of  a  
resilient  system  able  to  cope  which  changes  is  given  by  FedEx  in  the  US.  Night  flights  connecting  the  
regional  hubs  to  the  central  hub  are  only  60  percent  loaded.  This  allows  the  aircrafts  to  be  diverted  to  
other  destinations  in  order  to  recover  “at  risk”  cargos  and  ensure  the  quality  of  the  service  to  the  stake-­
holders.  
  
8.   Consequence-­based  design  or  design  thinking  against  the  fragility  of  sociotech-­
nical  organizations  
As  a  general  methodology,  we  argue  that  the  fundamental  rigorous  approach  of  structural  mechanics  
can  be  transferred  to  sociotechnical  organizations.  The  methodology  will  be  split  into  the  following  well-­
established  frameworks  (and  others  may  be  considered):  
•   Application  of  the  linear  theory  of  elasticity  and  visco-­elasticity;;  
•   Application  of  nonlinear  theory  of  plasticity  and  softening;;  
•   Application  of  the  theory  of  fracture  mechanics;;  
•   Application  of  the  complexity  theory;;  
•   Definition  of  consequence-­based  models  for  enterprises  and  institutions;;  
•   Biomimetics,  i.e.,  model  inspiration  from  Nature  [23].  
As  in  structural  engineering,  the  basic  considerations  in  Mechonomics  must  be  done  bearing  in  mind  
the  concept  of  elastic  material.  Elasticity  is  a  basic  property  of  solid  materials.  Applying  a  force  A  upon  
a  solid  body,  deformation  arises,  e.g.,  for  stretching  a  rubber  it  is  necessary  to  apply  a  force.  An  elastic  
	  	  
body  returns  to  its  initial  shape  after  removal  of  the  external  forces.   In  particular,  if  under  an  increase  
of  the  force  a  proportional  increase  of  displacement  R  occurs,  the  material  is  said  to  be  linear  elastic  
and  the  constant  of  proportionality  is  the  elastic  (or  Young’s)  modulus  K,  representing  the  stiffness  of  
the  material:  
R  (response)  =  K  x  A  (action)  
Linear  elasticity  is  the  behavior  of  the  majority  of  solid  materials  at  low  loadings.  Living  tissues,  like  e.g.,  
the  skin  of  human  body  exhibits  nonlinear  elasticity,  as  the  stiffness  K  is  not  constant  but  progressively  
increases.  This  behavior  gives  rise  to  the  so-­called  J-­curve,  which  represents  the  constitutive  behavior  
of  most  living  materials.  The  properties  of  the  J-­curve  are  truly  remarkable,  as  the  progressive  increase  
of  the  stiffness  means  that  the  internal  stored  energy  (the  dashed  area  under  the  curve)  is  kept  very  low  
although  deformations  can  be  very  large.  Low  stored  elastic  energy  implies  good  safety  against  rupture  
under  unexpected  events.  In  any  system,  the  elastic-­like  behavior  can  be  looked  for  when  considering  
a  dependent  variable's  sensitivity  to  a  change  in  another  (independent)  quantity.  In  human-­based  sys-­
tems,  the  elastic-­like  behavior  can  be  achieved  when  positive  counter-­reaction  mechanisms  R  and  ad-­
ditional  energy  resources  are  present  in  the  intimate  organization.  An  example  is  the  capacity  of  a  man-­
ufacture  plant  to  satisfy  the  growing  demand  for  goods  by  increasing  the  production  capacity  R  accord-­
ing  to  the  increase  of  the  demand  A.  Of  course,  on  the  opposite  side,  when  the  demand  decreases  the  
company  must  be  able  to  reduce  production  without  permanent  consequences  on  its  functioning  regime  
(i.e.,  without  discharging  some  people  from  employment  nor  dismissing  production  plants).  
Although   the   above   behavior  may   appear   as   expensive   and   inefficient,   this   is   not   the   case,   as   the  
dormant  production  energies  can  be  usefully  applied  on  parallel   tasks,  provided  a  beneficial   flexible  
workforce  organization  is  put  into  play  for  example  in  smart  factories  in  which  objects  can  be  tailored  
and  3D  printed  on-­demand.  We  have  stated  that  a  principal  cause  of  fragility  of  large  systems  is  repre-­
sented  by  the  so-­called  “size-­scale  effect”.  The  intrinsic  weakness  of  companies  and  banks,  which  in  
the  last  decades  largely  grew  through  merging  and  acquisition  strategies,  is  crystal  clear.  Good  man-­
agement  and  financial  practices  were  often  abandoned  in  the  name  of   irrational  growth.  However,   in  
many  business  sectors,  a  minimum  critical  mass  is   important  for  competing  in  the  global  market  and  
therefore  the  problem  of  system  size  cannot  be  merely  simplified.    
Sociotechnical  systems  are  usually  not  able  to  adapt  dynamically  their  internal  organization  to  external  
stimuli,  to  face  unexpected  scenarios,  they  should  be  designed  to  be  robust.  A  robust  system  is  able  to  
develop  plastic  mechanisms  without  compromising  the  overall  structure,  which  does  not  collapse.    
Structures  made  of  elements  in  parallel  have  shown  that  the  presence  of  preponderant  elements  largely  
affects   the  overall  behavior  once  damaged:  a  slight  variation  of   their  properties   implies   large  conse-­
quences  on  the  entire  systems.  In  this  sense,  in  the  perspective  of  designing  a  robust  system  it  is,  thus,  
better  to  have  equally  important  elements  in  it.  At  the  final  stage  of  damage,  that  is,  when  the  element  
is  totally  removed,  the  impact  on  the  system  depends  on  the  value  of  the  complexity.  Structural  com-­
plexity  measures  the  interaction  the  structural  elements  have  in  a  structural  scheme  (i.e.,  a  set  of  col-­
umns  and  beams)  [24].  As  much  as  the  complexity  reduces,  i.e.,  there  are  preponderant  elements  in  
the  construction,  the  average  effect  increases  dramatically.  For  complex  systems,  i.e.,  where  no  pre-­
ponderant  elements  are  present,  redistribution  mechanisms  are  present  when  a  part  is  removed.  Size  
effects  play  a  key  role:  the  larger  the  number  of  elements,  the  higher  possibility  of  redistribution  exists  
[25].  These  observations  are  valid  at  various  scales.  At  a  large  scale,  e.g.,  in  material  science,  it  is  well  
known  that  microstructural  disorder  and  complexity  provide  toughness  to  the  materials.    
In  order  to  provide  robustness  to  large  organizations,  we  suggest  to  use  the  approach  of  consequence-­
based  design  (CBD).  The  concept  of  consequence-­based  engineering  was  developed  in  the  framework  
of  earthquake  engineering  with  the  purpose  of  finding  alternative  strategies  to  reduce  seismic  risk  [26].  
The  problem  was   that  seismic  hazard  mapping   (and   the  corresponding  building   rules)  are  based  on  
statistical  analyses  of  historical  earthquake  events,  and  thus  it  is  not  possible  to  exclude  events  of  mag-­
nitude  larger  than  the  maximum  expected  one  (i.e.,  black  swans,  as  the  quake  occurred  in  Japan,  2011).    
The  basic  concept  of  CBD  is  that,  before  any  engineering  calculation,  the  estimate  of  all  the  possible  
consequences  to  adverse  events  should  be  carried  out,  independently  of  the  expected  loads  and  exter-­
nal  stresses  that  can  act  upon  the  structure  according  to  building  codes.    
The  designer,  before  any  engineering  calculation,  estimates  the  possible  consequence  on  the  system  
after  a  failure  on  one  of  its  parts.  The  attention  is  shifted  from  the  effects  of  the  external  stress  on  the  
element  on  the  consequences  on  the  whole  system.  This  approach,  called  consequence-­based-­design,  
does  not  require  a  complete  definition  of  the  hazards  on  the  system  and,  thus,  is  suitable  for  resilient  
and  robust  design.  Until  Sept.  11,  2001,  consequence-­based  methodologies  were  restricted  to  nuclear  
engineering  or  particularly  strategic  infrastructures.  
A  four-­step  decision  tree  can  be  adopted  to  determine  if:  (a)  estimated  consequences  are  acceptable,  
(b)  if  acceptable  consequences  should  be  redefined,  (c)  if  modelling  parameters  should  be  refined  and  
(d)   if   further   interventions  should  be  considered.   If  anticipated  consequences  exceed  tolerable  ones,  
and  no  further  redefinition  of  acceptability  is  feasible,  parameters  defining  the  hazard  can  be  refined  to  
reduce  anticipated   losses  (assuming  that   the  preliminary  analysis  were  conservative),  and/or  system  
	  	  
interventions  can  be  prescribed  for  the  same  purpose.  Iteratively,  consequences  will  be  estimated  for  a  
number  of  different  intervention  strategies  with  various  input  parameters  describing  the  hazard.    
Since  the  consequence-­based  approach  deals  with  the  effects  of  an  event  rather  than  with  its  causes,  
it   is  suitable  for  dealing  with  black  swan  events.  Following  Nafday  [27],  a  two-­stages  process  can  be  
applied  for  analysis  or  design  of  a  robust  organization  through  CBD.  In  the  first  stage,  the  system  will  
be  designed  following  the  common  rules  and  using  the  current  methods,  providing  appropriate  minimum  
redundancy,  continuity  and  inter-­member  ties.  Afterwards,  the  components  of  the  organization  will  be  
selectively  redesigned  for  ensuring  adequate  fault  tolerance  and  integrity,  based  on  their  role  and  im-­
portance  in  contributing  to  adverse  consequences.  These  consequences  can  either  be  the  system  col-­
lapse  or  any  other  pre-­defined  performance  criterion.  In  other  words,  local  events  will  be  randomly  ap-­
plied   to   the  components  of   the  organization,  simulating  all  possible  negative  consequences,  and  the  
residual  capacity  of   the  system  will  be  evaluated.  Capacity  requirements  for  each  component  will  be  
quantitatively  upgraded  following  their  specific  role  in  contributing  to  pre-­defined  adverse  consequences.  
The  concept  of  member  consequence  class   [26]  will  permit   to  differentiate  component   requirements  
based  on  their  role  within  the  organization.  The  basic  idea  is  to  control  the  consequences  of  a  failure  to  
minimize  the  risk.  The  consequences  of  failure  of  a  certain  member  can  thus  be  limited.  Even  if  the  size  
of  an  enterprise  has  to  be  large  for  some  reasons,  a  number  of  strategies  to  increase  its  resilience  can  
be  borrowed  from  engineering.  The  results  of  the  consequence-­based  methodology  will  be,  for  instance:  
•   to  increase  the  toughness  of  each  component  of  the  system  by  providing  ductile  characteristics  
at  all  hierarchical  organization  levels  [28];;  
•   to  provide  guidance  to  design  the  organization  with  redundancy  and  include  alternate  load  paths  
capable  of  by-­passing  the  failure  or  inefficiency  of  specific  components  [29][30];;  
•   to  prefer  and  select  parallel  task  arrangements  to  serial  arrangements  whenever  possible;;  
•   to   optimize   the   system  division   into  a   series  of  mutually   independent   entities   (i.e.,   compart-­
mentalize  the  system  by  means  of  fuse  elements  between  business  units  and  areas)  so  that  
local  stress  and  damage  events  are  not  transmitted  from  one  entity  to  the  closer  ones;;  
•   to  design  counter-­measures   to  network   failures  based  on   the   topology  (e.g.,   for  a  scale-­free  
organization  put  specific  attention  to  the  hubs);;  
•   to   exploit   complexity   at   all   levels   to   provide   anti-­fragility   to   the   internal   processes  
[24],[25],[26][31][32][33].  
The  above  strategies  are  inspired  by  the  evolutionary  processes  of  Nature,  which  have  provided  living  
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